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Public Records-Rightto Inspect-Remedies when Access is Denied.
A corporation duly organized under the laws of New Jersey for the
purpose of the examination, insurance and guaranty of the title to lands
and estates, or interests in lands, in the State, and the issuing of certificates, policies, contracts and undertakings therefor, is entitled to the
same right of access to and examination of the public records of the
county as an individual.
When employed to examine the title to any particular piece of property, such corporation is subrogated to the right of its employer to have
such access, and the fact that it contemplates making a contract of guaranty of the title to the land in question does not detract from such right
of access.
When the custodian of the records of which examination is sought
refuses to permit such a corporation to enjoy the right of access to them
to which it is entitled by law, and such right is clearly established, the
proper remedy is by injunction to prevent the custodian from interfering
with the corporation in the exercise of its right. The remedy by mandamus is, in such a case at least, entirely inadequate.
Opinion by PITNEY, V. C.
THE PROPER REMEDY FOR AN INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO PUBLIc RECORDS.
At common law there was no such
right of free access to and examination of public records as now exists by statute in most of the United
States. The right existed only in
regard to such records as had some
bearing upon a case pending (when
the usual practice to obtain an examination was by motion in the
cause), or where the records sought
to be examined were those records
of a corporation in which the corI Reported in
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Atl. Rep., 38r.

porators were supposed, in the view
of the law, to have a peculiar interest. (Hereford v. Bridgewater,
Bunb., 269; Att.-Gen. v. City of
Coventry, Bunb., 290; Herbert v.
Ashburner, I Wils., 297.) In the
latter case mandamus was held to
lie, even when there was an action
pending. (R. v. Tower, 4 Mf. &S',
162; Harrison v. Williams, 4 D. &
R., 82o.) And in the courts'of the
United States, where the 'right re-
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mains still subject to some of its
common-law limitations, the usual
practice is by petition for leave to
examine. (Re McLean, 9 Cent. L.
J., 425 (S. C., 8 Repr., 813); Re
Chambers, 44 Fed., 786.)
But which is the proper remedy
under the statutes which give the
right of free access to all public
records to any citizen, irrespective
of any interest he may have in
them? Is it mandamus to compel
the custodian of the records to allow
the relator the free exercise of his
right, or injunction to prevent him
from interfering with that right?
The principal case declares that injunction is the only adequate remedy; but an examination of the
cases will show that the weight of
practice, if not of positive authority,
is overwhelmingly in favor of the
procedure by mandamus. The latter was the form of action adopted
in Fleming v. Clerk, 30 N. J. L.,
280; State v. Williams, 41 N. J. L.,
332; Pe6. v. Cornell, 47 Barb. (N.
Y.), 329; Peo. v. Reilly, 38 Hun.
(N. Y.), 429; Peo. v. Richards, 99
N. Y., 620 (S. C., i N. B. Rep.,
258) ; Webber v. Townley, 43 Mich.,
534; Diamond Match Co. v. Powers, 5I Mich. 145; Burton v. Tuite,
78 Mich., 363; Aitcheson v, Huebner, Si N. W., 634; Hawes v. White,
66 Me., 305; Bean v. Peo., 7 Col.,
200; Stockman v. Brooks (Col.),
29 Pac,, 746; Phelan v. State, 76
Ala., 49; Randolph v. State, 82
Ala., 527; State v. Rachac, 37
Minn., 372; State v. Meadows, i
Kans. 9o; Cormack v. Wolcott, 37
Kans. 39t; Boylan v. Warren, 39
Kans., 301; Comm. v. O'Donnel,
12 W. N. C., 291. It is true that in
many of these cases the decision
was against the right of the relator
to exercise the right of examination
claimed; but in none of them, ex-

cept in Diamond Match Co. v. Powers, was it even hinted that the
complainant had made a mistake
in the form of his action. Indeed,
in two instances, Hawes v. White
and Stockman v. Brooks, it was expressly asserted that mandamus was
the proper remedy, without, however, extering into any discussion
of the question, or giving any reason for that assertion. On the
other hand, very few cases attempt
to assert the right of examination
by bill and injunction; and in but
one of these is it explicitly asserted
that such is the proper remedy, the
others either refusing the injunction, or allowing it without any
discussion on that head. Buck v.
Collins, 51 Ga., 391; Scribner v.
Chase, 27 Ill. App., 36; Belt v. Abstract Co., 20 Atl., 982; West Jersey Title & Guarantee Co., v. Barber (the principal case), 24 Atl., 381.
It seems clear that as far as results
only are concerned, it makes no
practical difference which form of
action is adopted ; for in either case
the result is the same. If the complainant proceeds by mandamus,
he obtains a decree commanding
the respondent to permit him to
exercise his right of examination
of the records; if he proceeds by
bill and injunction, he obtains a
decree commanding the defendant
to abstain from any interference
with him in the exercise of that
right; thus in either case guaranteeing to him the free and undisturbed exercise of it The deciding point, then, must be the nature
of the right which is sought to be
enforced; whether it is one which
is more properly enforced by mandamus, or by injunction.
The essential distinction between
mandamus and injunction is thus
laid down ilf High on Extraordi-
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nary Legal Remedies, 2d Ed. (1884),
sec. 6, p. io: "An injunction is essentially a preventive remedy, mandamus a remedial one. The former is usually employed to prevent
future injury, the latter to redress
past grievances. The functions of
an injunction are to restrain motion
and enforce inaction, those of a
mandamus to set in motion and
compel action. In this sense an injunction may be regarded as a conservative remedy, mandamus as an
active one. The former preserves
matters in statu quo, while the very
object of the latter is to change the
status of affairs and to substitute
action for inactivity. The one is,
therefore, a positive or remedial
process, the other a negative or
preventive one. And since mandamus is in no sense a preventive
remedy, it cannot take the place of
an injunction, and will not be employed to restrain or prevent an
improper interference with the
rights of relators." So, too, an injunction is the proper remedy
where the injury is such "as from
its continuance or permanent mischief must occasion a constantly
recurring grievance, which cannot
be otherwise prevented." Hilliard
on Inj., see. 3r, p. 20. In general,
"it is used to prevent future injury rather than to afford redress
for wrongs already committed, and
it is therefore to be regarded more
as a preventive than as a remedial
process." High on Inj., 2d Ed.,
sec. i, p. 3. The interference of
the Court by injunction "rests-on
the principle of a clear and certain
right to the enjoyment of the subject in question, and an injurious
interruption of that right, which,
on just and equitable grounds,
ought to be prevented."
Wait,
Act. & Def., Vol. 3, p. 687.

In order to warrant the issuing
of an injunction, then, the complainant must have a clear right
which is injuriously affected by
the acts of the defendant; and if
the right be not clear, he will be
sent to law to establish his right.
The same is true of mandamus:
Wait, Act. & Def., Vol. IV, p. 376;
but that being a proceeding at law,
is an eminently proper method
of establishing a questioned right.
It is worthy of note that a large
majority of the cases in which
mandamus was invoked to assert
the right to the examination of
public records were cases of first
impression, or cases in which the
right claimed did not exist; and it
may be that this fact had some influence in determining the form of
action.
But where the right is
clear, there are certain advantages
peculiar to the process by injunction which that by mandamus does
not possess.
In the first place, as quoted above,
mandamus is used to redress past
grievances, injunction to prevent
future injury. In the class of cases
under discussion, then, when the
injury complained of is a single refusal to permit the complainant to
examine the records at a particular
time, and there is no claim that he
has any desire to examine them at
the present or any future time, and
consequently no likelihood that
the injury may be repeated, there
would seem to be good reason for
holding that mandamus is the
proper remedy, the injury being
past. In such a case the process
by mandamus would permit the
relator to examine the recor-s for
the purpose in his mind at the time
when the examination was denied
him; but would not afford him any
assurance that the right would not
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be denied him at any future time
when he might again have occasion
to examine them. In other words,
it would be entirely in the power
of the custodian of the records to
refuse the relator access to them at
each and every time when he should
wish to examine them, and he
would be put to the trouble of a
new writ for each such invasion of
his right. In point of fact, this
was done in one case, that of Burton v. Tuite, go Mich., 218, and
although the Court got over the
difficulty by calling in the doctrine
of contempt, yet there are reasons
which would lead one to doubt the
propriety of such an exercise of the
strong arm of the Court. If the
order was for a single examination,
the officer would hardly be in contempt for refusing a second; and if
.the order was to permit any and all
examinations, it is not quite clear
how such an order could be made
with propriety when one refusal
only had been complained of. It
would seem, then, far preferable to
use the extraordinary powers of the
Court in the first place by way of
injunction, which would properly
cover all instances; anl contempt
could then be predicated with propriety of any violation of the injunction decree.
In the second place, the cause of
action in such cases is rather for
interference with a right, than for
the establishment or enforcement
of a right; and in such a case the
proper remedy is by injunction to
prevent such interference.
In the third place, the remedy by
mandamus is wholly inadequate to
redress a continuing grievance, for
the simple reason, as has been seen
above, that the writ only applies to
past grievances, and for every successive invasion of the complain-

ant's rights-he is obliged to sue out
a new writ; provided, of course,
that the respondent is contumacious. And while there is authority for the view that redress
can be had: by process for contempt, yet it may be very plausibly
argued that the exigency of the
writ is answered by permission for
a single examination, and that it is
then exhausted. This, too, would
seem to be the correct inference
from the nature of the writ. But
in the case of injunction no such
argument could be urged; for then
the command of the writ would be
to abstain from all interference
with the complainant in the exercise of his right of examination,
and its exigency would not be exhausted during life, or the continuance of the defendant in office.
Finally,.the Court will not grant
a mandamus unless convinced that
it will be practically effective to
secure the object aimed at: Shortt,
Inf. Mand. & Quo. War., p. 246.
And there are strong reasons for
believing that mandamus would
not be an efficient, or perhaps too
efficient, remedy in many cases.
When the right claimed is one that
would require the use of the office
of the custodian for many days, so
as to be likely to interfere with the
duties of the office, or with the
rights of others of the public, mandamus would simply command the
officer to permit the relator to exercise his right, without regard to
the rights of others, or the paramount claims of the public business, and the courts would have no
power, in adjudicating the bald
question of right, to annex to that
right the necessary restrictions.
This very argument was one of the
reasons for refusing the writ in
several of the cases; and while it
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cannot avail to defeat the right
when it exists, supposing that mandamus is the proper remedy, it
should nevertheless be one of the
potent factors in settling the question whether or not it is the proper
remedy. In granting an injunction, however, the Court can annex
to it all proper and necessary qualifications of the exercise of the right
interfered with, and uno flatu settle
all the conflicting interests and
rights of the officer, the public and
the complainant.
These reasons dre very fully and
clearly stated in the two cases
which have condescended to discuss the question, where it would
seem that the courts arrived at
their conclusions independently of
each other. At all events, the
earlier case is not referred to in the
latter. The former case, however,
Diamond Match Co. v. Powers, 51
Mich., 145, went off on other
grounds, but the discussion of the
present question is very interesting
and instructive. "It seems evident
that in any case where the claim is
for a continuous use of the record
office and its public contents from
day to day and week to week, and
not merely for a single occasion,
with all its material facts defined,
there must be great, if not insuperable difficulty in enforcing the
claim by mandamus. The register
has rights and duties which must
be respected; so the general public
have rights as well as the claimant;
and the conditions are not steadily
the same. They are subject to
variation. , On every occasion each
must act reasonably, and with
proper regard for the rights and
duties of the others. As the circumstances vary the conduct must
vary, so as to secure conformance
to the rule of reasonable action by

which the right is to be regulated.
When the case presents a single
occasion, and calls for an actwhich
is presently determinate, it is entirely practicable to direct the act
by mandamus. But where the case
contemplates something continuous, yet variable in its conditions
and aptitudes, the remedy by that
process seems an unfit one. It is
the office of mandamus to direct
the will, and obedience is to be enforced by process for contempt. It
is, therefore, necessary to point out
the very thing to be done; and a
command to act according to circumstances would be futile."
The advantages of the procedure
by injunction are even more forcibly pointed out in the opinion of
the Vice-chancellor in West Jersey
Title & Guarantee Co. v. Barber,
24 Atl., 381 (the principal case):
"With regard to the remedy by
mandamusit seems to me that the
slightest consideration will show
that it is entirely inadequate. If
the complainant has the right
which it claims to have access to
the books and records in defendant's office, it is one which, from
the nature of the business, is a
continuing one, and may arise
every day, and one which, to be of
any value,, must be exercised at
once. To delay its exercise until
it could be determined by a court
of law would be simply to deny it,
because, before the judgment could
be obtained, the value of its exercise in the particular instance complained of would be lost. If, indeed, the right of the complainant

here in question is not so clearly
established at law as to warrant
the interference of this Court by
the strong arm of an injunction,
that alone is a sufficient answer to

the complainant's case, and the
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complainant will be, as a matter of
course, turned over to a court of
law, to establish there its right by
a test case; but when that is once
established, it would be a denial of
justice to say that, in every instance that it is desired to exercise
the right already clearly established, it must resort to its legal
remedy, and can have no lielp from
this Court. If, then, the complainant's right is clear at law and
not open to question, it seems to
me that it is entitled to the aid of
this Court to enjoin the defendant
from preventing its exercise."
These arguments are certainly
entitled to careful consideration;
and a close examination will find
but little that can be urged against
them. It may be safely concluded,
then, that whenever the right of
examination claimed is not for a
single instance, but for a continu-

ous period of time, whether long
or short, the proper remedy is by
injunction; and that the remedy
by mandamus in cases of this nature is confined to those instances
in which a single exercise only of
the right is claimed; or, to give
this discussion a concrete value,
that the proper remedy for any interference with the right of examination by a private individual,
searching the records for his own
private purposes or curiosity, would
be by mandamus; but the remedy
for an interference with the right
of examination by an abstractor of
titles or a title insurance company,
whose business naturally calls for
constant and even daily investigation of the records, would, on account of its continuous nature, be
by injunction.
ARDEMUS STEWART.

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF VIRGINIA.

EARLY V. COMMONWEALTH.'

Confessions- When Deemed to be Voluntary.
On the trial of an indictment for arson, evidence was offered by the
prosecution to prove certain confessions made by the accused to a private
detective, employed to work up the case, who arrested him. The accused
testified that the detective said "that if he would tell him all about it he
would make it easier for him." Held. affirming the Court below, that
the evidence was admissible, as, taking the accused's testimony as true,
the inducement was not offered by a person in authority.
LEWIS, P.
ABSTRACT FROM THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

The objection is to the action of the Court in admitting
evidence to prove certain confessions by the prisoner. The
evidence was objected to on the ground that the confession
was not voluntary. The confession was made to the wit,

iS.

E. Rep., 795-
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ness, Hale, who testified that it was made, so far as he
knew, without any inducement having been offered by any
one. The witness also testified that he was informed by
Wren, a detective, who had been employed by the corp"ration of Rocky Mount to ferret out evidence of the burning,
that the prisoner desired to make a confession to him (the
witness); that, accompanied by Wren, he went tc the
prisoner and had a conversation with him; that in the
course of that conversation Wren stated to the prisoner
that, if he made any statement at all, it must be with the
understanding that it was freely and voluntarily made,
without the influence of hope or fear, and .that thereupon
the confession was made. The prisoner, however, upon
this point, testified that before the conversation just alluded
to Wren said to him that if he would "tell him all about
it he would make the Commonwealth make it easier" on
him, and that in consequence of this assurance he made
the confession in question. On the other hand, one Edwards, another detective, testified that before Wren spoke
to Hale on the subject of the proposed confession, he heard
a conversation between Wren and the prisoner, in which
Wren remarked to the prisoner that, if he wanted to make
any statement to him, he could not offer him anything, but
that his statement must be voluntary. This, he says, he
heard, although he did not hear all that. passed between
them. Wren, it appears, was discharged as a witness by
the attorney for the Commonwealth before the trial, and
did not testify. We are of opinion that, under these
circumstances, the confession was admissible in evidence.
There is no doubt but that, before a confession can be
rightly admitted, the Court must be satisfied that it was
voluntary-that is, that it was made without the influence
of hope or fear exerted by a person in authority, or with the
apparent sanction of such person; and the burden of showing that it was voluntary is upon the Commonwealth. But
here, taking the prisoner's own statement to be true, no
inducement was offered by any one in authority.
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THS ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFrSSIONS AS EVIDENCE.

I. The Test of Admissibility.The admissibility of confessions as
evidence in criminal prosecutions
depends upon the credibility given
them by the circumstances under
which they were made. They have
value as evidence only when freely
and voluntarily made, when they
are presumed to flow from. a conscience overburdened with a sense
of guilt, and are therefore admitted
as a proof of the crime to which
they refer. It is to be presumed
that a man will not of his free will
impute to himself a crime of which
he is innocent, but the law recognizes the susceptibility of human
nature to the violent influences of
pain or danger, or the hope of escape therefrom, and, ever seeking
the truth, guards jealously against
the causes which may produce a
false confession. 4 Bl. Com., 357;
Foster's Crown Law, 243; Joy on
Confessions, *12; Simon's Case,
6 C. & P., 541; In the People v.
McMahon, 15 N. Y., 384; SELDN,
J., states clearly a principle which
should be noted. "'The first distinction which the law makes is
between a statement or declaration
made before, and one after the accused was conscious of being
charged or suspected with the crime.
If before, it is admissible in all
cases, whether made under oath or
without oath, upon a judicial proceeding, or otherwise; but if made
afterward,the law becomes at once
cautious and hesitating. The inquiry then is, is it voluntary,-does
it proceed from the spontaneous
suggestions of the party's own
mind, free from the influence of
any extraneous disturbing cause ?"
I. The Presumption as to the

Admissibility of a Confession.The determination of the question
of admissibility is of course the
province of the judge. The rule
as to the presumption which obtains
when the confession is first offered
in evidence, in England, uniformly
is that the confession was involuntary, and the burden of proving
the contrary is upon the prosecution. Thus, in R. v. Warringham,
2 Den. C. C., 447, Parke, B., said,
"You are bound to satisfy me that
the confession which you seek to
use against the prisoner was not
obtained by improper means." In
the United States, the rule varies.
Young v. State, 68 Ala., 569; Nicholson v. State, 38 Md., 14o; People
v. State, 49 Cal., 69; Barnes v. State,
36 Tex., 356; Thompson v. Comm.,
2o Gratt. (Va.), 724; and People v.
Swetland, 77 Mich., 61, follow the
English rule. In other cases, the
confession is presumed to be voluntary, but the defendant is protected
by his privilege of objection to its
introduction. Comm. v. Culver,
126 Mass., 464; Comm. v. Sego,
125 Mass., 21o; Reefer v. State, 25
Ohio St., 464; State v. Davis, 34
La. An., 351; O'Mahoney v. Belmont et al., 62 N. Y., 117.
The rules laid down by SirJames
Stephen in his Digest of the Law
of Evidence for determining the
admissibility, or voluntary nature
of confessions are as follows:
"No confession is deemed to be
voluntary,
(a) if it appears to the judge to
have been caused by any inducement, threat orpromise, proceeding
from a person in authority, and
having reference to the charge
against the accused person, whether
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addressed to him directly or brought
to his knowledge indirectly;
(b) if (in the opinion of the
judge), such inducement, threat or
promise gave the accused person
reasonable grounds for supposing
that by making a confession he
would gain some advantage or
avoid some evil in reference to the
proceedings against him.
(c) A confession is not involuntary, only because it appears to
have been caused by the exhortations of a person in authority to
make it a matter of religious duty,
or by an inducement collateral to
the proceeding, or by inducements
held out by a person not in authority."
II. Inducements which Render a
Confession Involuntary and Inadmissible.-ILeaving for future consideration the question of who is a
person in authority within the
meaning of the rule, we will consider what inducements are regarded as sufficient to render a confession given in consequence thereof
The decisions are
inadmissible.
not uniform, and the same lack of
unanimity characterizes the decisions on every branch of the subject.
In 3 Russell on Crimes, 368, it is
laid down that a confession, in order to be admissible must be "free
and voluntary," that is, it must not
be extracted by "any sort of threat
or violence, nor obtained by any
direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of
"Tke
any improper influence."
law cannot measure the force
of the influence used, or decide its effect upon the mind of
the prisoner, and, therefore, excludes the declaration if any degree
of influence has been exerted."
F,'RE, C. J., in Warickshall's Case,
i Leach C. C., 263, gives the reason

for the rule, saying, "a confession
forced from the mind by the flattery of hope or by the torture of
fear, comes in so questionable a
shape when it is to be considered
as the evidence of guilt, that no
credit ought to be given to it; and,
therefore, it is rejected. In a note
to this case, a case illustrative of
the reason is given. One of three
men, tried and convicted of the
murder of one H., confessed himself guilty, under a promise of pardon. The confession, therefore, was
not given in evidence against him,
and a few years afterward it appeared that H. was alive. In the
earlier cases the Courts appear to
have been astute to seize upon anything that by any possibility could
be considered to have influenced
the defendant to confess.
In Rex v. Drew, 8 Car. & r., r4o,
the prisoner was told "not to say
anything against himself, as what
he said would be taken down and
used for or against him at his trial,"
and in Reg. v. Farley, I Cox, 76,
the prisoner was told by a policeman, that whatever she told him
would be used against her on her
trial. This last case was decided
on the authority of Rex v. Drew,
holding that to assure the prisoner
that whatever she said would be
used at her trial, was holding out
to her an advantage which rendered
her statement inadmissible. Regina
v. Harris, i Cox, 166, was decided
similarly.
In Reg. v. Jones, MAULB, J.,
said: "To tell a prisoner what he
says will be given in evidence
against him is an inducement, for
if he is told that it is to be. used at
all, it may induce him to say something that he may suppose may
make for him." These cases were
cited and overruled in Reg. v.
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Baltry, 2 D. C. C., 430 (1852), where
the policeman, having the defendant in custody, told him the nature of the charge against him, and
said: "You need not say anything
to criminate yourself, but what you
do say will be taken down and used
in evidence against you." PoLLoCK, C. B., deciding in favor of
the admission of the statement,
said: "The words employed by the
constable amount neither to a
promise or a threat. They are to
be taken in their obvious meaning,
and when a confession is well
proved, it is the best evidence that
can be produced; unless it is clear
that there was a threat or a promise
to induce the confession, it should
be admitted." This case marked
the aversion, which had long been
growing, with which the judges
had come to regard the exclusion
of valuable evidence for reasons of
littleweight. In Comm. v. Vhittemore, ii Gray, 202; Comm. v. Sego,
125 Mass., 2Io; Rex V. Jarvis, L. R.,
I C. C. R., 96. However, where it
was said that it "would be better"
to confess, this was held to be a
promise of worldly advantage,
which would exclude the confession. Rex v. Kington, 4 C. & P.,
287; Rex v. Dunn, 4 C. & P., 543;
Rex v. Slaughter, 4 C. & P., 353;
Rex v. Walkely, 6 C. & P., 175;
Rex v. Thomas, 6 C. & P., 353;
Comm. v. Kennedy, 135 Mass., 543;
Kelley v. State, 72 Ala., 244; State
v. Wintzingrode, 9 Or., 153; State v.
Alphonse, 34 La. Ann., 9; Vaughan
v. Comm., 17 Gratt. Va., 576;
People v. Thompson, 84 Cal., 598;
Comm. v. Hannan, 4 Pa. St., 269;
State v. York, 37 N. H., 175. On
the other hand, it has been held
that such words would not render
confessions inadmissible. Reg. v.
Parker, Leigh & Cave, 42; Fonts V.

State, 8 Ohio, N. S., 98; Aaron v.
State, 37 Ala., Io6; Young v.
Comm., 8 Bush, 366; State v. Freeman, 12 Ind., loo; State v. Whitfield, 70 N. C , 356.
Mere admonitions to tell the
truth have been held sufficient to
exclude, R. v. Holmes, 1 C & K.,
248; R. v. Upchuck, i Mos. C. C.,
465; State v. Hagan, 54 Mo., 192,
7o N. C., 356; R. v. Fennell, 72 B.
D., 147; R. v. Mansfield, 14 Cox C.
C., 639. But the sounder docrine
undoubtedly is that a mere adjuration to speak the truth will not exclude where there were no threats
or promises. Whart. Cr. Ev., Sec.
647, 652, 654; Aaron v. State, 37
Ala., Ic6; King v. State, 40 Ala.,
314; Kelly v. State, 72 Ala., 244.
And in R. v. Jarvis, L. R., x C. C.
R., 96; R. v. Sleeman, I Dears. C.
C., 249; R. v. Reeve, L. R., 1 C. C.,
362, it is held that where the words
used only import advice on moral
grounds, the statement made in
consequence were admissible, and
that the cases to the contrary have
gone too far.
Promises of favor or assistance
will exclude, Cass's Case, I Leach,
293; or a hope of pardon, Comm. v.
Knapp, 9 Pick., 497; a release "if
he would tell." Mountain v. State,
40 Ala., 344; or in hope of being
admitted as a witness for the prosecution. Spears v. State, 2 0. St.,
583; State v. Johnson, 30 La. An.,
P. II, 88.
A promise of a collateral benefit
is not an inducement sufficient to
render a confession inadmissible.
i Greenl. Ev., Sec. 229. Thus, in
Rex. v. Lloyd, 6 C. & P., 353,
where the constable told the
prisoner that if he would tell he
could see his wife, who was confined in a separate room, the statement following was admissible.
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State v. Tatso, 50 Vt., 48; Rutherford v. Comm., 2 Metc. Ky., 387;
State v. Wentworth, 37 N. H., 196.
In Rex v. Sexton, 3 Russ. C. & M.,
368, a confession made after the
prisoner's request for a glass of
.gin had been granted, was held
inadmissible. The correctness of
this discision has been seriously
doubted. The inducement offered
must be of a strictly temporal advantage. Thus, exhortations by the
chaplain of the jail, appealing to
the prisoner to ease his soul by a
confession, will not render such
confession inadmissible. R. v. Gilham, i Mo. C. C., 186. So, the remark, "an honest confession is
good for the soul." 9 Lea. Tenn.,
128.

For the purposes of this note a
further discussion of inducements
and their effect is unnecessary.
They are fully treated of in Wharton's Crim. Law; Greenl. Ev., and
Am. and Eng. Encyl. of Law.
IV. Who is a person in authority?
The rule as given by Stephen
indicates that an inducement must
be offered by a person in authority
in order to vitiate the confession,
and that an inducement offered by
one not in authority will have no
effect. This is accepted both in
England and the United States; but
it may be profitable to seek to
ascertain what is requisite to constitute a person in authority within
the meaning of the rule.
As in the question of inducements, the courts were more liberal
in the earlier cases in construing
the effect of the status of the person offering the inducement upon
the mind of the accused. In more
than one case it was seriously
doubted whether anything beyond
the terms and effect of the inducement, perse, should be considered,

and in Rex v. Dunn, 4 C. & P.,
543, BOSANQUBT, J., said, "Any
person telling a prisoner that it will
be better for him to confess, will
always exclude any confession
made to that person." This, while
it was a departure from established
principle as laid down in the cases
of Rex v. Hardwick, Rex v. Gibbons, I C. & P., 97, and Rex v.
Tyler, i C. & P., 129, was followed
in Rex v. Slaughter, 4 C. & P.,
544, note; and in other cases, at
least rendered the admissibility of
the evidence a dubious question.,
Thus, while a prisoner was in custody, he was told by a person without authority that it would be
better for him to confess, and
he thereupon made a statement.
PARKB, B., said: "There is a difference of opinion among the
judges whether a confession made
to a person who has no authority,
after an inducement is held out by
that person, is receivable in evidence: Rex v. Spencer, 7 C. & P.,
302; Rex v. Pountney, 7 C. & P.,
302. But in Taylor's case, 8 C. &
P., 733, it was held that a confession
must have been induced by a person in authority in order to repel
the presumption of its truth: Rex
v. Hardwick, Rex v. Gibbons, and
Rex v. Tyler, supra. And in Reg.
v. Mloore, 2 Den. C. C., 527, it was
declared that a confession is admissible though obtained by threats
and inducements,, provided such
threats and inducements were held
out by a person not in authority.
Also, where the inducement is held
out in thefpresence of one in authority, it is presumed to have been
with his sanction, and, therefore,
inadmissible. Thus, where the inducement was held out by the
magistrate's clerk, in the presence
of the magistrate: Drew's case, 8,
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C. & P., 14o; Moody's case, 2 Crawf.
In some of the States a much
& Dix C. C.; Rex v. Laugher, 2 C.
broader rule has been laid down.
& K., 225; Rex v. Kingston, 4 C.
Thus in Murphy v. State, 63 Ala. i
& P., 387; Cohen v. Kennedy, 135
(1879), the Court said: "A confesMass., 543; U. S. v. Chapman, 4 sion induced by hope or fear, exAm. L. J. (N. S.), 44o.
cited in the mind by the represenIn Jones v. State, 58 Miss., 349,
tations of any one connected with
the sheriff went with W., a stranger
the prosecution, or connected with
to the prosecution, to the jail, and the accused, who may, considering
while there was told by the cell- his relations and condition, befairmate of the defendant that he, the ly supposed by him to have power
defendant, wished to make a con- to secure him whatever of benefit
fession, as his father told him it is promised, or to influence the
would be better for him to tell the threatened injury, cannot be retruth. The sheriff, with W., saw garded as voluntary and ought not
the man, and told him that his con- to be received as evidence. This
fession could not benefit him. W. view was approved in People v.
then said that it "would be better Walcott, 51 Mich., 612 (1883),
to tell the truth," and the man where three persons, none of whom
made a statement. Held, that the were in a position of authority,
sheriff could not be presumed to gained admission to the cell of the
have sanctioned the inducement of- accused in the dead of night and
fered by W., as he had just before secured a confession by representtold the prisoner that his confession ing that it would be "better to tell
could not benefit him.
the truth." In sharp contrast to
STEPHEN says that "the prothe decision of the Michigan court
secutor, officers of justice having is the decision in Comm. v. Cuffee,
the prisoner in custody, magistrates
lo8 Mass., 285 (1871), where the
and other persons in similar posi- confession of a boy of thirteen, artions are persons in authority. The rested without a warrant and upon
master of the prisoner is not such
suspicion, elicited from him by two
. person in authority if the crime police officers who questioned him
-of which the person making the for two hours, after searching him
-confession is accused was not com- and stripping him, and without
-mited against him." This is also warning him of his right not to
-the general rule in the United answer, or giving him an oppor.States: People v. Ward, I5 Wend.,
tunity to consult counsel, was held
231; Wolf v. Comm. 3o Gratt., 833; admissible on his trial for the crime.
State v. Brockmann, 46 Mo., 566; In this case the reason the Court
Rector v'. Comm. 80 Ky., 468; U. S. gave was that there were no threats
-V. Pocklington, 2 Cr. C. C., 293; or promises made by the officers
which would induce the prisoner
State v. Staley, 14 Minn., ioS. In
Russ on Crimes, it is said that all to confess. Commonwealth v. Nott,
engaged in the apprehension, pro- 135 Mass., 269, is more orthodox,
secution or examination of the where an inducement held out in
prisoner are persons in authority the presence of a superior officer
renders the ensuing statement inwithin the meaning of the rule:
Smith v. Comm. IO Gratt., 734; admissible. But the Massachusetts
courts seem in a number of cases
Wolf v. Comm. supra.
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to have disregarded the rule of exclusion whenever its technicalities
were not met by the case in hand:
Comm. v. Tuckerman, io Gray,
x73; Comm. v. Smith, ii 9 Mass.,
305; Comm. v. Cuffee, su 'ra. The
cases in the Federal courts, while
adhering to the letter of the rule,
do not go beyond it or disregard it
to such an extent as the courts of
Massachusetts.
The true note was sounded in the
case of Murphy v. State (63 Ala.,
I, 1879), where the Court defines
a person in authority to be "any one
connected with the prosecution, or
connected with the accused, who
may, considering his relations and
condition, be fairly suppfiosed by
him to have power to secure him
whatever benefit is promised, or to
influence the threatened injury."
In the principal case, the case of
U. S. v. Stone is relied upon as deciding that a detective, who is employed by the owners of stolen
goods to find them and to institute
civil or criminal proceedings regarding the same, is not a person in
authority whose inducements will
prevent a confession inadmissible
in evidence. There is a slight distinction, however, between the facts
of Stone's case and the subject of
annotation. In the first, at the

time the inducements (which were
slight) were made, no process had
issued against the defendant, nor
had any criminal proceedings been
instituted. In the principal case,
according to the hypothesis of the
judge, "if what the defendant says
is true," the inducements were held
out after the defendant was under
arrest, when all confessions are regarded suspiciously. How far we
can go before we are beyond the
pale of those who are "engaged in
the prosecution or apprehension of
a prisoner" it is difficult to say,
but the impression of the detective
upon the prisoner's mind must
have been that of a person clothed
with authority, and the inducements held out were more than
sufficient. Rules cannot be formulated which can meet the necessities of every case. Age, condition,
situation, character and attending
circumstances must always enter
into the problem. Certainly, from
the trend of decisions, it appears
that the old fear, that the rule of
exclusion has been carried too far,
and "in its application justice and
common sense have too frequently
been sacrificed at the shrine of
mercy," still exists in the breasts
of the judiciary.
HENRY N. SMALTz.

